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Abstract
This study explores the topic of N -person cooperative game theory. The
following paper begins with an introduction to the basic definitions and the-
orems of game theory. These definitions and theorems are then used to in-
troduce various solution methods and methods of coalition formation. These
results are then applied to the airport game, to the supplier-firm-buyer game,
and to evolutionary games.
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Chapter 1
Definitions and Notation
Introduction
Chapter 1 will provide basic definitions and notation necessary to discuss the
two major issues at the center of n-person cooperative game theory: coalition
formation and distribution of wealth gained through cooperation. The reader
will be introduced to the characteristic equation and the properties it may
possess. We will define a (0, 1)-normalized game and prove that every essen-
tial cooperative game is strategically equivalent to one and only one game in
this form. The payoff vector is also discussed in this chapter as well as the
properties it may hold. The main references of chapter 1 are Colman [2] and
[1a], Driessen [3], Forgo´-Sze´p-Szidarovszky [4] , Jianhua [7], Luce-Raiffa [10],
Owen [12], Rapoport [13], Thomas [18], and Vorobe´v [20].
An n-person cooperative game involves n players, where n > 2, and agree-
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ments regarding the correlation of strategies between two or more players are
permitted.
The most concise representation for cooperative games is the character-
istic function form.
Definition 1.1 Let N = {1, ..., n} represent the n players. If v(S) is a
real-valued function defined on the set of all subsets S of N , satisfying
v(∅) = 0, (1.1)
v(N) ≥
n∑
i=1
v({i}), (1.2)
we say that Γ ≡ [N, v] is an n-person cooperative game, and v(S) is said
to be the characteristic function of the game Γ.
Definition 1.2 Any non-empty subset S of the set N (S ⊂ N) is a possible
coalition .
Suppose S ⊂ N is a coalition, then v(S) represents the maximum utility (for
simplicity, money) S can get without correlating strategies with the other
N \ S players.
Definition 1.3 A coalition which contains all n players is called the grand
coalition, and v(N) represents the maximum expected payoff of this coali-
tion.
2
There are several properties which can be used to classify an n-person
cooperative game. For example, games can be divided into categories such
as constant-sum or non-constant-sum, and essential or inessential.
Definition 1.4 A game is said to be constant-sum if
v(S) + v(N \ S) = v(N)
for every S ⊂ N.
Definition 1.5 If the sum of expected payoffs, given by v(S), in a game Γ
is different depending on which players form a coalition, then game is called
a non-constant-sum game.
Suppose S and T are disjoint coalitions, then clearly if they form a coali-
tion, they should receive at least as large a payoff as they would by remaining
separate.
Theorem 1.1 Jianhua [7] Let Γ ≡ [N, v] be an n-person cooperative game.
Then
v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) (1.3)
for all S, T ⊆ N , S ∩ T = ∅.
3
Proof: The coalition S can guarantee obtaining an amount v(S) and no
more. Similarly, the coalition T can guarantee obtaining the amount v(T )
and no more. Hence, the coalition S ∪T can obtain the amount v(S) + v(T )
even if S and T fail to cooperate with each other. Since the maximum the
coalition S ∪ T can obtain under any condition is v(S ∪ T ), this implies
v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ).
Definition 1.6 Inequality (1.3) is called the superadditive property of
the characteristic function v. If equality holds in (1.3), that is for all S, T ⊆
N,S ∩ T = ∅, we have
v(S ∪ T ) = v(S) + v(T ),
we say v is additive .
The superadditive property of the characteristic function implies that
the ”union” of all players (i.e. the grand coalition) (and unions of smaller
coalitions into larger ones) is profitable because the corresponding payoff is
increased. If the additive property holds in the characteristic function, then
the players gain nothing by forming coalitions in the given game.
Definition 1.7 An n-person cooperative game with additive characteristic
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function is called an inessential game. All other cooperative games are
essential.
Inessential games are trivial, because players have nothing to gain by
forming a coalition. This can be seen in Theorem 1.2.
Theorem 1.2 Jianhua [7] In order that a characteristic function be addi-
tive, it is necessary and sufficient that the equality
n∑
i=1
v({i}) = v(N) (1.4)
be satisfied.
Proof: Necessity of equality (1.4) is directly implied by the additivity as-
sumption. For sufficiency of the condition, assume that (1.4) holds. Let
S, T ⊆ N,S ∩ T = ∅. Using the superadditivity of v successively, we have
v(N) =
n∑
i=1
v({i})
=
∑
i∈S
v({i}) +
∑
i∈T
v({i}) +
∑
i∈N\S∪T
v({i})
≤ v(S) + v(T ) + v(N \ S ∪ T )
≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(N \ S ∪ T )
≤ v(N)
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Hence v(S) + v(T ) = v(S ∪ T ).
Since there are many types of cooperative games, it is beneficial to classify
them in a manner such that games with similar basic properties belong to
the same class. To do this, we must determine what makes two characteristic
functions strategically equivalent.
Definition 1.8 Two characteristic functions, v and v ′ associated withN , are
strategically equivalent if a positive number k and arbitrary real numbers
ci (i ∈ N) exist such that for any coalition S ⊂ N , the equality
v′(S) = kv(S) +
∑
i∈S
ci
is satisfied.
It is this property that enables us to normalize a cooperative game.
Definition 1.9 A game Γ = {N, v} is said to be (0, 1)− normalized if
v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N,
v(N) = 1.
It is clear that all (0, 1)-normalized games are essential.
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Theorem 1.3 Forgo´-Sze´p-Szidarovszky [4] Among games strategically equiv-
alent to an essential game Γ = [N, v], there is exactly one (0, 1)-normalized
game.
Proof: Taking Γ
′
≡ [N, v
′
] with v
′
(S) = cv(S) − c
∑
i∈S v({i}) and c
−1 =
v(N)−
∑n
i=1 v({i}) shows that there is a (0,1)-normalized game strategically
equivalent to Γ ≡ [N, v]. To show there is only one such game, we need to
have a solution to the following system of equations
kv({i}) + ci = 0, for all i ∈ N (1.5)
kv(N) +
n∑
i=1
ci = 1.
for unknowns k, c1, ..., cn.
Since Γ is essential, v(N) −
∑n
i=1 v({i}) > 0. By elementary algebra, we
can find the unique solution of (1.5):
k =
1
v(N)−
∑n
i=1 v({i})
> 0
ci = −kv({i}),
which is the game with the desired property.
Every player of a cooperative game has a right to receive his share of the
total payoff v(N) available. Let us assume that the distribution of utilities
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available to the set of players in N is such that each player i ∈ N receives
the amount xi. The assignment of utilities can be represented by the payoff
vector x = (x1, ..., xn). These assignments cannot be arbitrary; they must be
governed by certain restrictions.
Definition 1.10 A payoff vector x is called an imputation if it satisfies
the following conditions:
xi ≥ v({i}), for all i = 1, ..., n, (1.6)
n∑
i=1
xi = v(N). (1.7).
If relation (1.6) is not true, then player i will certainly refuse to accept the
distribution since he or she is guaranteed the amount v({i}) without forming
any coalitions. Thus, relation (1.6) is known as the condition of individual
rationality .
Relation (1.7) is the condition of group rationality, also known as the
condition of Pareto optimality . This condition is necessary, for if
v(N) >
n∑
i=1
xi,
then the players can form the grand coalition N to obtain the total payoff
v(N), in which case each player i could receive an additional amount besides
8
xi. This distribution scheme would never be accepted by the players. On the
other hand,
v(N) <
n∑
i=1
xi
is impossible, since v(N) by definition of the grand coalition is the greatest
amount possible and the total distribution cannot exceed the total income.
Theorem 1.4 Vorobe´v [20] An inessential game has only one imputation.
This imputation is
x = (v({1}), ..., v({n})).
Proof: Let x = (x1, ..., xn) be an imputation of an inessential game Γ =
[N, v]. Assume that
xi > v({i})
for some i. Then by (1.6)
n∑
i=1
xi >
n∑
i=1
v({i}).
Now the left-hand side of this inequality equals v(N) by (1.7). By the addi-
tivity of the characteristic function, the right-hand side of the inequality also
equals v(N). This implies that v(N) > v(N), which is impossible. Thus, for
every i we have
xi = v({i}).
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This proves the game has a unique imputation
x = (v({1}), ..., v({n}).
As will be seen in the following chapter, imputation domination plays a
key role in several solution methods.
Definition 1.11 Given v, we say imputation x dominates imputation y
through coalition S (notation x >S y) if
xi > yi, i ∈ S (1.8)
∑
i∈S
xi ≤ v(S). (1.9)
Condition (1.8) states that all the members of coalition S prefer imputation x
to imputation y, since each player i, a member of S, receives a larger payoff
via imputation x. Relation (1.9) says that coalition S was guaranteed to
obtain what imputation x give them.
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Chapter 2
Solution Methods
Introduction
This chapter supplies the reader with information about several solution
concepts used in cooperative game theory. By a solution, we mean how
payoffs will be disbursed among players. Some of the earliest defined concepts
are that of the core, the strong ²-core, the least core, and the von Neumann
and Morgenstern solution. More recent solution theories include the Shapley
value and the nucleolus. References in this chapter are taken from Driessen
[3], Forgo´-Sze´p-Szidarovszk [4], Jianhua [7], Owen [12], Thomas [18], and
Vorobe´v [20].
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2.1 The Core
The solution concept known as the core of an n-person cooperative game
was first defined by Gillies [6]. In Chapter 1, we discussed both group and
individual rationality, thus defining an imputation. Placing a further collec-
tive rationality stipulation on all possible coalitions of players produces the
solution concept known as the core.
Definition 2.1 The set of all undominated imputations for a game Γ is
called the core . The core of a game Γ is denoted by C(Γ).
Theorem 2.1 Thomas [18] In order that imputation x belong to the core
of a cooperative game with the characteristic function v, it is necessary and
sufficient that the inequality
v(S) ≤
∑
i∈S
xi for all S ⊂ N (2.1)
be satisfied.
Proof: Necessity. It is sufficient to consider games in (0,1)-normalized form.
Let
v(S) >
∑
i∈S
xi > 0
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for the imputation x and for some coalition S. Observe that the coalition S
must consist of more than one player, otherwise that last inequality violates
the individual rationality of imputation x. For a similar reason, S should be
different from N . We now have
∑
i6∈S
xi = v(N)−
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S)−
∑
i∈S
xi > 0.
Now choose ² such that
0 < ² <
1
|S|
(
v(S)−
∑
i∈S
xi
)
,
and construct the vector y = (y1, ...yn) by setting
yi =
{
xi + ², if i ∈ S,
1
|N\S|
(
∑
i6∈S xi − |S|²), if i 6∈ S.
Direct verification shows that y is an imputation and moreover y >s x.
Therefore, x does not belong to the core and the necessity of (2.1) is verified.
Sufficiency. Assuming that imputation x is dominated by imputation y, we
have for some coalition S
∑
i∈S
xi <
∑
i∈S
yi ≤ v(S),
which violates (2.1) and proves the sufficiency of the condition.
The previous theorem implies that for an imputation to belong to the
core of a given cooperative game, the components of the imputation must
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satisfy a finite system of linear inequalities. The most likely case in which
a core exists is that of an inessential game. Finding a solution using the
concept of the core is not so easily done for essential games. In fact, this is
impossible for the constant-sum case as proved by the following theorem.
Theorem 2.2 Owen [12] Let Γ ≡ [N, v] be an essential constant-sum n-
person cooperative game. The core of the game is the null set.
Proof: Assume the core is not empty, and let x ∈ C(Γ). Then by definition,
for every i we have
v({i}) ≤ xi,
v(N \ {i}) ≤
∑
j∈N\{i}
xj.
Now sum the two inequalities. Since the game is constant sum, the sum of
the two left-hand terms is v(N). On the other hand by the definition of an
imputation, the two right-hand terms also add to v(N). Hence equality holds
in the first inequality for all i, i.e.,
v({i}) = xi, i = 1, ..., n. (2.2)
It follows from (2.2) that the game is inessential. Therefore, C(Γ) = ∅.
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In Examples [2.1] and [2.2] of Chapter 2 the graphs are created using
barycentric coordinates. In general, points X = (x1, x2, x3) satisfying
x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0, x3 ≥ 0, (1)
x1 + x2 + x3 = 1, (2)
may be represented graphically using barycentric coordinates. Let 123 be an
equilateral triangle with unit perpendicular bisectors and with its vertices
labeled 1, 2, and 3. For every point X in this closed triangle, let x1, x2, x3
be the distance from X to the sides of the triangle opposite the vertices 1, 2,
3, respectively. Then x1, x2, x3 satisfy the conditions (1) and (2); see Figure
(2.1). They are called the barycentric coordinates of X.
The barycentric coordinates of the vertices 1, 2, and 3 are (1,0,0), (0,1,0)
and (0,0,1), respectively. The equations of the three sides 23, 31, and 12 of
the triangle are
x1 = 0, x2 = 0, x3 = 0,
respectively.
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Figure 2.1: Graph of X = (x1, x2, x3)
Consider the values of the characteristic function v of a general 3-person
cooperative game in (0,1)-normalization
v(i) = 0, i = 1, 2, 3,
v(N) = 1, v(1, 2) = c3, v(1, 2) = c2, v(2, 3) = c1,
where c1, c2, c3, are constants in the closed interval [0,1]. Domination of
imputations is impossible with respect to either a one-person coalition or the
grand coalition N . Consider domination with respect to the coalition {1,2}:
y Â{1,2} x,
where x and y are imputations in X. By definition
v(1, 2) = c3 ≥ y1 + y2,
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y1 > x1, y2 > x2.
Since y is an imputation, we know y1 + y2 + y3 = 1 using substitution, we
get
y3 ≥ 1− c3.
This inequality means that point y should lie on or to the right of the line
y3 = 1− c3. Similarly, y2 ≥ 1− c2 means that point y should lie on or to the
left of y2 = 1 − c2 and y1 ≥ 1 − c1 means that y should lie on or above the
line y1 = 1− c1.
Example [2.1] Jianhua[7] Suppose the values of the characteristic function
of a three-person cooperative game Γ are
v({i}) = 0, i = 1, 2, 3,
v({1, 2}) =
2
3
, v({1, 3}) =
7
12
, v({2, 3}) =
1
2
,
v({1, 2, 3}) = 1.
By definition of the core, the imputation x = (x1, x2, x3) ∈ C(Γ) if and
only if
v({1}) = 0 ≤ x1, v({2}) = 0 ≤ x2,
v({3}) = 0 ≤ x3, v({1, 2}) =
2
3
≤ x1 + x2,
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Figure 2.2: Graphical representation of core in Ex [2.1]
v({1, 3}) =
7
12
≤ x1 + x3, v({2, 3}) =
1
2
≤ x2 + x3.
By means of the condition of group rationality (1.7), the last three of the
above inequalities reduce to
x3 ≤
1
3
, x2 ≤
5
12
, x1 ≤
1
2
.
Therefore, the core of Γ is the shaded area in figure (2.2). It is a triangle
including its sides.
2.2 The Strong ²-Core and The Least Core
Since the core is often empty, the strong ²-core was introduced.
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Definition 2.2 An n-dimensional payoff vector which does not satisfy the
condition of individual rationality
xi ≥ v(i), for all i = 1, ..., n
but does satisfy the condition of group rationality
x(N) = v(N)
is called a pre-imputation.
Note that
∑
i∈N xi = x(N) and X
∗ is the set of all pre-imputations.
Definition 2.3 Let Γ ≡ [N, v] be an n-person cooperative game. For every
pre-imputation x ∈ X∗ and every coalition S ⊆ N , define the excess of S on
x by
e(S, x) = v(S)− x(S).
The excess represents the difference between v(S) and the sum of the payoffs
that the distribution scheme x offers to the members of S, if the coalition is
formed. If e(S, x) is positive, then there is a gain in the total payoff to the
members of S with respect to x. Clearly, if e(S, x) is negative, there is a loss
to coalition S compared to the payoff offered to them in vector x.
19
Definition 2.4 Let Γ ≡ [N, v] be an n-person cooperative game, and let ²
be a real number. The set of pre-imputations
C²(Γ) = {x : x ∈ X
∗; e(S, x) ≤ ², for all S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅,N}
is called the strong ²-core of Γ.
By placing the following stipulation on the strong ²-core of an n-person
cooperative game one can reduce the number of possible solutions and form
the least core.
Definition 2.5 Let Γ ≡ [N, v] be an n-person cooperative game. If ²0 is the
smallest ² for which C²(Γ) 6= ∅, then C²0(Γ) is called the least core of Γ and
is denoted byLC(Γ).
To clarify the relationship between the core, strong ²-cores and the least
core, the following example is given.
Example [2.2] Jianhua [7] Let us begin by simplifying our notations as
follows:
v(1) = v({1}), x(1) = x1 = x({1}),
e(1) = e({1}, x), v(13) = v({1, 3}),
etc.
20
Figure 2.3: Graphical representation of Ex [2.2]
The characteristic function v of a three-person cooperative game Γ has
the following values:
v(i) = 0, i = 1, 2, 3,
v(12) =
1
3
, v(13) =
1
6
, v(23) =
5
6
,
v(123) = 1.
Figure (2.2) shows the core C(Γ) = C0(Γ) and the strong ²-cores for
² = 1
6
. C(Γ) is a quadrangle and C 1
6
is a pentagon. The least core is C−1
12
(Γ).
It is the line segment parallel to the side 23 of the imputation triangle.
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2.3 The von Neumann and Morgenstern So-
lution
We now introduce another solution-finding method. The von Neumann and
Morgenstern solution was developed in 1944 and is also known as the stable
set solution. This solution set is partly based on a relationship between
imputations called domination.
Definition 2.6 Let X be the set of all imputations of an n-person coopera-
tive game Γ. If V ⊆ X is a set of imputations satisfying the conditions:
1. for any x ∈ V and y ∈ V ,x 6> y
2. if w 6∈ V , then there exists z ∈ V such that z > w,
then the set V is called the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution of Γ.
If property (1) holds then S is said to be ”internally stable”, and if property
(2) holds S is said to be ”externally stable.”
Now that we have a method for determining whether an imputation is
part of the solution set, how useful is this in finding a solution for a large
class of games?
Theorem 2.3 Forgo´-Sze´p-Szidarovszk [4] Every superadditive, essential,
three person game has at least one von Nuemann and Morgenstern solution.
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Proof: Due to the length of the proof it will not be included in this text.
The proof can be found in an Introduction to the Theory of Games[4].
It has been proved that von Nuemann and Morgenstern solutions do exist
in four-person games, however there has been no success in either proving
or disproving that all five- to nine-person games have a von Neumann and
Morgenstern solution. A 10-person game without a stable set has been con-
structed. There has been no success in finding a stable set solution in the
case of constant-sum games.
Despite all this uncertainty there are a few special n-person games for
which stable sets always exist.
Definition 2.7 A superadditive (0, 1)-normalized game is said to be simple
if for each S ⊂ N , either v(0)=0 or v(S)=1.
Theorem 2.4 Forgo´-Sze´p-Szidarovszky [4] Let Γ = [N, v] be a simple game
and let S be a minimal winning coalition (such that v(S) = 1, but v(T ) = 0
for all T ⊂ S, T 6= S). Let VS be the set of all x ∈ I (I is the set of
imputations) such that xi = 0 for all i 6∈ S. Then VS is a stable set.
Proof: If S = N , then VS = I is a trivial stable set. So we assume S 6= N .
To prove internal stability suppose that x, y ∈ VS. x >M y is only possible
for a coalition M ⊂ S, if xi > 0, i ∈ M and
∑
i∈M xi ≤ v(M). Since S is a
23
minimal winning coalition, S = M . Since
∑
l∈S xl =
∑
x∈S yl = 1 if xj > yj
for some j, then there is a k 6= j such that xk < yk, k ∈ S, making domination
impossible. (Note that |S| > 1.)
For proving external stability take y 6∈ VS, yk > 0 and thus δ = 1 −
∑
i∈S yi > 0. Define z = (z1, ..., zn) as
zi =
{
yi +
δ
|N\S|
if i ∈ S,
0 if i 6∈ S.
It is elementary to see that z ∈ VS, and z >S y.
2.4 The Nucleolus
The solution known as the nucleolus has two very useful properties:
(a) every game has one and only one nucleolus, and
(b) if the core exists, the nucleolus is part of it.
The basic idea is to make the most unhappy coalition under the given impu-
tation happier than the most unhappy coalition under any other coalition.
The question is then how do we know which coalition is the most unhappy.
A coalition’s unhappiness is determined by looking at what the coalition
expected to get given the characteristic function versus what payoff was ac-
tually received, i.e., v(S)−x(S). The larger this number is the more unhappy
the coalition is with imputation x.
24
Given an n-person game Γ and payoff x = (x1, ...xn), define the 2
n-vector
θ(x) as the vector whose components are the excesses of the 2n subsets S ⊂
N , arranged in decreasing order, i.e.,
θk(x) = e(Sk, x),
where S1, S2, ..., S2n are the subsets of N . These values should be arranged
by
e(Sk, x) ≥ e(Sk+1, x).
Example [2.3] Owen [12]In a three-person game Γ, where v(S) = 1
if S has two or three players and v(S) = 0 otherwise, the payoff vector
(0.2, 0.4, 0.3) gives us the excesses displayed in Table 2.1. Thus, θ(x) =
(0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.1, 0,−0.2,−0.3,−0, 4). Suppose we have a payoff vector y =
(0.3, 0.5, 0.2); then θ(y) = (0.5, 0.3, 0.2, 0, 0,−0.2,−0.3,−0.5).
Table 2.1 Excesses found for Ex [2.3]
S v(S)− x(S) = e(S, x)
∅ 0 - 0 = 0
{1} 0 - 0.2 = - 0.2
{2} 0 - 0.4 = - 0.4
{3} 0 - 0.3 = - 0.3
{1,2} 1 - 0.6 = 0.4
{1,3} 1 - 0.5 = 0.5
{2,3} 1 - 0.7 = 0.3
N 1 - 0.9=0.1
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Definition 2.8 The nucleolus of an n-person cooperative game Γ is the set
N(Γ) of imputations x ∈ X such that θ(x) of is minimal in the
lexicographical ordering.
Suppose we are given two vectors
α = (α1, ..., αq) and β = (β1, ..., βq).
Then α is lexicographically smaller than β if there exists some integer k,
1 ≤ k ≤ q, such that
α` = β` for l ≤ ` < k,
αk < βk.
The notation α <L β shall be used for this relation, and α ≤L β if either
α <L β or α = β. In the previous example, we find that θ(y) <L θ(x),
because θ1(x) = θ1(y) but θ2(y) < θ2(x).
Theorem 2.5 Jianhua [7] Let Γ ≡ [N, v] be an n-person cooperative game.
Then the nucleolus N(Γ) of the game is non-empty.
Proof: This proof shall be omitted, however it can be found in The Theory
of Games [7].
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Theorem 2.6 Forgo´-Sze´p-Szidarovszk [4] Let N(Γ) be the nucleolus of an
n-person cooperative game. Then |N(Γ)| = 1, i.e., N(Γ) consists of one
element.
Proof: Due to the length of this proof it shall be included in the text. The
reader can find this proof in Introduction to the Theory of Games [4].
The nucleolus is called a one-point solution due to Theorem 2.6.
2.5 The Shapley Value
One of the most famous one-point solution concepts is the Shapley value.
This value represents the payoff a given player will expect to get before play
begins. Shapley [16] developed three axioms, which he felt φi(v), player i’s
expectation in a game with characteristic function v, should satisfy. Before
stating these axioms, the following definitions will be introduced.
Definition 2.9 A carrier for a game v is a coalition T such that, for any
S, v(S) = v((S ∩ T )).
Definition 2.10 Let Γ be an n-person game, and let pi be any permutation
of the set N . Then by piv we mean the game u such that, for any S =
{i1, ..., iS},
u({pi(i1), pi(i2), ..., pi(iS)}) = v(S).
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By the value of the game Γ, we mean an n-vector,φ[v] satisfying,
1. If S is any carrier of Γ, then
∑
S
φi[v] = v(S).
2. For any permutation pi, and i ∈ N ,
φpi(i)[piv] = φi[v].
3. If u and v are any games,
φi[u+ v] = φi[u] + φi[v].
These are Shapley’s axioms. They are sufficient to determine a value φ
uniquely for all games.
Theorem 2.7 Owen [12] There is a unique function φ, defined on all games,
satisfying Axioms 1-3 namely:
φi(v) =
∑
S⊂N
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
(v(S)− v(S − {i}) (2.8)
where s = |S| (the number of members of S).
Proof: This proof shall be ommited. It can be in several text including
Game Theory [12]. This function φi is called the Shapely value.
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Now we will use the Shapely value to determine the disbursement of
payoffs for the three-person cooperative game used as an example in the
least core section of this chapter.
Example [2.4] The game had the following values:
v(i) = 0 i = 1, 2, 3,
v(12) =
1
3
, v(13) =
1
6
, v(23) =
5
6
,
v(123) = 1.
To find φ1(v), we sum over the coalitions S = {1}, {12}, {13}, {123} and
substituting into (2.8) gives:
φ1(v) =
0!2!
3!
(0− 0) +
1!1!
3!
(
1
3
− 0
)
+
1!1!
3!
(
5
6
− 0
)
+
2!0!
3!
(
1−
1
6
)
= 0 +
1
18
+
1
36
+
1
18
=
5
36
.
For φ2(v) we sum over S = {2}, {12}, {23}and{123} so :
φ2(v) =
0!2!
3!
(0− 0) +
1!1!
3!
(
1
3
− 0
)
+
1!1!
3!
(
5
6
− 0
)
+
2!0!
3!
(
1−
1
6
)
= 0 +
1
18
+
5
36
+
5
18
=
17
37
.
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For φ3(v) we sum over S = {3}, {13}, {23}and{123} so :
φ3(v) =
0!2!
3!
(0− 0) +
1!1!
3!
(
1
6
− 0
)
+
1!1!
3!
(
5
6
− 0
)
+
2!0!
3!
(
1−
1
3
)
= 0 +
1
36
−
5
36
−
2
9
=
14
36
.
Thus, the Shapley value of this game is
φ(Γ) =
(
5
36
,
17
36
,
14
36
)
.
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Chapter 3
Coalition Formation
Introduction
Thus far we have addressed the question of how payoffs will be divided among
players of an n-person cooperative game. In this chapter, we ask which
particular coalitions are likely to form. There are three such theories that
will be discussed. Komorita’s [8] equal excess model is one of the few theories
designed to deal with both the coalition formation and payoff division. The
minimal winning coalition strategy, developed by Riker, [14] is based on the
idea that if a coalition is large enough to win then, it should avoid adding
new members, since payoffs must be shared amongst these new members.
Gamson’s [5] minimum resource theory assumes that players in the winning
coalition should demand payoffs corresponding to their voting strength in the
coalition. The main references used in Chapter 3 are Gamson [5], Komorita
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[8], and Riker [14].
3.1 Equal Excess Model
There are two basic principles that make up the equal excess model. An
individual’s “bargaining strength” is one such principle. Bargaining strength
in negotiations is based on the alternative coalitions the player can form.
The second underlying principle assumes that members of a potential
coalition are most likely to agree on a division based on sharing equally the
excess of what can be gained by the coalition, relative to the total outcomes
if each chose his best alternative.
We shall assume that individuals are motivated to maximize expected
payoffs, which is typically a goal in most theories of coalition formation.
Unlike other theories, however, we shall assume social psychological motives
also play a role in coalition formation. Furthermore, we shall assume that
the value of each coalition represents transferable utilities. The following
three-person game will be used to illustrate the model:
Example [3.1] Komorita [8] Here and elsewhere in this chapter we will
denote the players by letters rather than integers. Let
v(A) = v(B) = v(C) = 0; v(ABC) = 0;
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v(AB) = 6; v(AC) = 5; v(BC) = 4.
Players must determine their initial demands in negotiations. An indi-
vidual’s preferences and expectations during various stages are specified in
Assumptions (1) and (2). We will illustrate the assumptions afterward with
this example.
Assumption (1) Prenegotiations are driven by an individual’s desire to
form the coalition that maximizes initial expectation, given by:
E0iS =
v(S)
s
(3.1)
where E0iS denotes the initial expectation of individuals i in coalition S. Note
that s represents the number of players in coalition S.
It is impossible for any player to obtain a payoff unless a coalition with
exactly two members is formed. In the above example, initial expectations of
the three possible coalitions and their payoffs defined by (3.1) are 3 each for
A and B in the AB coalition; 2.5 each for A and C in the AC coalition; and
2 each for the B and C in the coalition BC. It is obvious that by Assumption
(1) A and B will initiate negotiations. The dividing of rewards is negotiated
based on a player’s expectations in other possible coalitions. It goes without
saying that the better the quality of a player’s alternatives, in comparison
to the alternatives of the other players, the greater his or her bargaining
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strength. Due to different expectations of players, one or more players may
concede to reach an agreement. These concessions will likely be made in
random stages of negotiations. Assumption (2) is designed to account for
these concessions.
Assumption (2) Since expectations of players change when a coalition
forms after a round of negotiations, the most likely coalition to form is the one
in which all players’ expectations are jointly maximized. The most probable
distribution of payoffs is represented by the equal excess norm, as follows:
EriS = maxS 6=TE
r−1
iT +
(v(S)−
∑
maxEr−1jT )
s
(3.2)
where EriS represents the expectation of individual i in coalition S on round
r; max Er−1iT denotes individual i’s maximum expectation in alternative coali-
tions on round r − 1; and the summation is over the members of coalition
S.
Definition 3.1 A sequential process in which each person makes an offer
or counteroffer, and each player accepts or rejects offers, which are received,
determines a round of the game.
Assumption (2) implies that if v(S) exceeds the sum of players’ expecta-
tions, the excess will be divided equally among the players of the coalition.
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Returning to the example, if player A and B negotiate in the first round,
player A would have a maximum expectation of 2.5 via coalition AC, while
B’s maximum expectation would only be 2.0 from the BC coalition. Applying
(3.2) we have:
E1A(AB) = 2.5 +
[6.0− (2.5 + 2.0)]
2
= 3.25
E1B(AB) = 2.0 +
[6.0− (2.5 + 2.0)]
2
= 2.75
Given the model, we conclude that if the AB coalition forms on the first
interchange of offers, the payoff would be divided as 3.25 − 2.75 for players
A and B, respectively.
Based on the iterations of (3.2), expectation predictions of this model can
be made for later rounds. A few of these predictions are listed in Table 3.1.
Analyzing the predictions, we see that player A’s expectations increase as
the number of rounds increases regardless of the coalition in which A resides.
However, player C’s expectations decrease in both the AC and BC coalition.
As rounds progress, player B increases expectation if coalition BC is formed,
but decreases expectation when coalition AB is formed. Also note that at the
limit, the predicted shares of the players equals their maximum expectations
in alternative coalitions. If players reach an agreement at the limiting value,
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the above fact implies that no player will be tempted to leave the coalition.
Given a player’s desire to maximize expectation, we can deduce from
Table 1 that if coalitions form in an early round of play, coalition AB will
most likely form. However as the number of rounds increases, the likelihood
of coalition BC forming increases. In theory, all three coalitions are equally
likely to form if there are an indefinite number of rounds.
A certain degree of indeterminacy is found in this model since the number
of rounds necessary for an agreement to be reached is unknown. This number
depends partially on the competitiveness of the players. Assuming the players
are highly competitive, it may take many rounds of negotiations to reach an
agreement. In this case, the asymptotic expectations probably yield the best
estimate of payoffs. Now suppose the players are not very competitive. In
this case only a few rounds of play will be required for an agreement to be
made and expectations found for earlier rounds are likely to yield the best
estimate of payoffs.
Table 3.1 Predictions for Ex [3.1]
Coalition Expectations over Rounds
˜ 0 1 2 5 Asymptote
AB 3.0-3.0 3.25-2.75 3.37-2.62 3.49-2.51 3.50-2.50
AC 2.5-2.5 3.00-2.00 3.25-1.75 3.48-1.52 3.50-1.50
BC 2.0-2.0 2.25-1.75 2.38-1.62 2.48-1.52 2.50-1.50
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3.2 Minimal Winning Coalition Strategy
The focus of this theory is how a players “influence of position” affects payoff
distribution.
Definition 3.2 A decision is a selection among alternatives.
A decision made by the players will lead to a particular payoff. Often a
player may be capable of influencing decisions more than deemed possible
given his “resources”. This is due to his ability to influence other players
with his position.
Definition 3.3 A resource is a weight associated with each player in a way
that some critical quantity of these weights is necessary for a decision to be
made.
Definition 3.4 Any group or individual who carries out the same coalition
strategy until a decision is made is called a social unit.
A coalition is a social unit from its conception until a decision is made.
Definition 3.5 Any coalition capable of controlling a decision through suf-
ficient resources is a winning coalition.
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Definition 3.6 The decision point is the minimum proportion of resources
necessary to control the decision.
Definition 3.7 Losing coalitions which have the power to prevent the other
coalitions from winning are called blocking coalitions.
According to Gamson[5], a full-fledged coalition situation is one in which
the following conditions are present:
1. There is a decision to be made and there are more than two social units
attempting to maximize their shares of the payoff.
2. No single alternative will maximize the payoff of all participants.
3. No participant has dictatorial powers.
4. No participant has veto power.
Conditions one and two deem that every player has some bearing on the
game’s outcome. Condition three says no one player initially has the re-
sources to control the decision by himself or herself. In condition four we
find that no member is included in every winning coalition. This game may
be classified as essential if conditions one, two, and three hold. Note that
essential is defined differently here than from Chapter 1. These conditions
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also prevent the occurrence of the trivial solution. Blocking coalitions are
prevented by condition four.
The model requires information about several matters the to predict coali-
tion formation. These are identified and discussed next.
1. “The initial distribution of resources.” We must know which resources
are of value for a particular decision. Then for some starting point an
inventory must be taken of each player’s resources.
2. ”The payoff for each coalition.” The characteristic function defined
in chapter one is determined by computing payoffs to any subset of
players and an assumption is made that the remaining players will form
a single coalition. This assumption reduces every game to a two-player
game. The minimal winning coalition strategy does not make such
an assumption. We must know every alternative coalition, including
partitions into more than two classes of players. This implies that
a particular subset may receive one payoff when the complementary
set is partitioned in one manner and an entirely different payoff if the
complementary set is partitioned in a different way.
If would seem that the function which is required to supply all such
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partitions would be more complicated than the characteristic function.
Since the Gamson theory yields only one winning coalition and the pay-
off to all other players, which are not members of the winning coalition,
is zero, we need only know the possible winning coalitions.
The probability of achieving future rewards is reflected in the payoff
since it includes anticipation of future events.
Definition 3.8 The expected value or payoff for a coalition is found
by multiplying the total payoff of that coalition by the probability of
the coalition’s achieving that payoff.
3. “Non-utilitarian strategy preferences.” Each player must make a list,
which ranks every other player in the order he or she would be inclined
to join them in a coalition. Ties are allowed and ranks should be
assigned with no regard to the other player’s control or resources.
4. “The effective decision point.” Often the rules of the game assign a
specific amount of resources necessary to control the decision. This
amount is known as the formal decision point. This amount, however,
may be more than sufficient to gain control of the decision. If control
of the decision is possible with fewer resources than specified in the
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rules of the game, then that smaller amount of resources is an effective
decision point.
Definition 3.9 A winning coalition that is no longer winning if one player
leaves the coalition is called a minimal winning coalition.
We use the term minimal here to show that this is the smallest number of
players whose total resources are large enough to control the decision.
Definition 3.10 The minimal winning coalition with total resources closest
to the decision point is called the cheapest winning coalition .
Definition 3.11 For an empirical value K in a given coalition situation, a
set of payoffs, of which the lowest is no more than K percent less than the
highest, is defined as a payoff class.
The theory applies to full-fledged coalition situations in which we assume
the following to be true:
Assumption (1) The same information about initial distribution of re-
sources and the payoffs to any coalition are known by all the players. This
assumption does not imply that the players have perfect information.
Assumption (2) Payoffs in the same payoff class are indistinguishable by
players.
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Assumption (3) A rank ordering of non-utilitarian coalition preferences
for joining with other players is done by every player. By non-utilitarian we
mean an ordering not based resources.
The general hypothesis of the theory states that any player will expect
others to demand from a coalition, a share of the payoff proportional to the
amount of resources that they contribute to a coalition.
It is possible for a player A to know a personal payoff value from any
possible coalition formation. To calculate a personal payoff player A multi-
plies his proportion of the resources in the coalition by the total payoff of the
coalition. These values can then be assigned to payoff classes which A will
prefer the highest. The coalition whose members have the highest mean rank
on player A’s scale of non-utilitarian preferences will be A’s preference within
a payoff class. When the total payoff to the winning coalition is constant,
player A will seek to maximize his payoff by maximizing his shares, i.e., he
will favor the cheapest winning coalition.
Example [3.2] Gamson [5] Suppose player A has 30 percent of the re-
sources, B has 19 percent, C has 30 percent, and D has 21 percent where the
decision point is 51 percent. Player A should consider the minimal winning
coalitions of AC and AD. Since both player A and player C own 30 percent of
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the resources, they would half the payoff. However if player A joined player
D, he would expect about 3
5
of the payoff. If the payoff for each coalition
is different, then A’s payoff could possibly be higher in coalition AC than
in coalition AD. In accordance with the minimal winning coalition theory, if
the payoffs are in the same payoff class, player A would choose to join the
one in which he ranks higher on non-utilitarian strategy preference.
A coalition will form if and only if there are reciprocal strategy choices
between two players. For example, in a three person game, if player A desires
to form a coalition with player B, and player B prefers either coalition AB
or BC, and player C wants to form a coalition with player A, only A and B
have reciprocal strategy choices. Therefore, the theory predicts coalition AB
will form.
3.3 The Minimal Resource Theory
Before a discussion of Riker’s strategy for coalition building can begin, a
brief dynamic model should be introduced. Players are often referred to as
the decision-making body, N . This model operates under the rules of an
n-person zero-sum game with “side payments” allowed.
Definition 3.12 A player’s weight refers to his influence, power, or signif-
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icance in relation to other players.
A coalition with weight m, where m > 1
2
∑n
i=1 wi where wi is the weight of a
member, i, can act for or impose its will on all players.
Coalition building begins when a leader allies himself with other players
on a particular issue for decision.
Definition 3.13 A member who manages the growth of a coalition is known
as the leader.
Definition 3.14 To form a coalition, a leader must lure followers, which
are members of the body who join the association the leader forms.
We will now make a distinction between a coalition and a proto-coalition.
Definition 3.15 The word coalition will describe the end product of the
decision-making process.
Definition 3.16 The association (leading to a coalition) a follower joins is
a proto-coalition.
More precisely a proto-coalition is any subset of N , when N is partitioned
into three or more disjoint subsets such that no subset has the weight m.
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Definition 3.17 The acts of joining or resigning from a proto-coalition is
defined as a move .
Definition 3.18 If two or more members or proto-coalitions agree upon
simultaneous actions, we refer to them as simultaneous moves .
When moves occur, the proto-coalition will change size. After a move the
internal structure of the body changes and a player’s strategy will also change.
Definition 3.19 A stage is defined as the interrelationship of proto-coalitions
just before (or after) a move is made.
In stage one, there are n single-member proto-coalitions. The second
stage will have one two-player proto-coalition and (n−2) single player proto-
coalitions. The final stage, r, is reached when there exists a winning coalition
or two blocking coalitions. Players are not aware when they are in the (r−1)th
stage.
Definition 3.20 A side payment is the gift of anything of value in order
to lure followers into a proto-coalition.
Leaders make use of side-payments to attract followers into proto-coalitions.
The leader may possess the side payment before his offer, or he may be
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making the offer in hopes of paying the follower from the payoff received by
the winning coalition.
Since side payments are made with items of value, they obviously affect
the coalition-building process. They will limit the number of players a leader
asks to become followers. This fact in turn will cause opposition, since some
players being left out will form another proto-coalition.
A player’s quest to belong to the winning coalition in the rth stage of
the game will guide his moves in stage (r − 1), as well as in previous stages.
Leaders of proto-coalitions must know how alternative outcomes in the rth
stage are affected by moves made in all previous stages to insure they will
be members of the winning coalition.
Definition 3.21 The last member to join a minimal winning coalition is
said to occupy the pivotal position.
In order to determine his options at a given stage (other than the initial),
a leader needs to know his chance of winning given the immediate state
of arrangements into proto-coalitions. At this point he is not concerned
with his chance of pivoting. There are three general considerations that
may affect a leader’s chance of winning. One such consideration is how
much dependence upon unique events occurring during the course of play
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a winning coalition may have. Traditions may also play a major role in a
leader’s chance of forming a winning coalition. It may depend, in part, on
general considerations inherent in the game model, such as the size principle.
The size principle limits in some way the range of possible outcomes of
a game and may place drastic restrictions on coalitions that are likely to
form. Any proto-coalition in the jth stage that can form a minimal winning
coalition, while others cannot, has a strategic advantage. To assure situations
arise in which such advantages exist the leader of a proto-coalition needs
specifications of the situations. Riker [14]formalizes these situations as:
1. uniquely preferable winning coalitions
2. uniquely favorable proto-coalitions
3. uniquely essential proto-coalitions
4. unique coalitions
5. strategically weak proto-coalitions.
Discussion of the uniquely preferable winning coalition will be limited (1)
to the (r − 1)th stage and (2) to those situations in which there are no more
than five proto-coalitions.
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Example [3.3] Riker [14] Suppose there are five proto-coalitions, A,B,C,D, andE,
which are disjoint subsets of N . Note that A ∪ B ∪ C ∪D ∪ E = N . Then
their weights must satisfy the inequality m > w(A), w(B), w(C), w(D), w(E)
since A,B,C,D, and E are proto-coalitions. Without loss of generality we
may assume w(A) ≥ w(B) ≥ w(C) ≥ w(D) ≥ w(E). If only three subsets
are nonempty, then we label them A, B, and C and D and E do not occur.
Similarly if the set is partitioned into four subsets, then only subset E does
not occur. Notation for partitions of N into a different number of subsets is
needed. Thus, An will be used for the weightiest proto-coalition (or one of the
equally weightiest) when the players are partitioned into n proto-coalitions.
This would imply that A1 is equivalent to N . If N is partitioned into two
subsets then A2 and B2 are the names of the winning and losing coalition (or
of two blocking coalitions). Assume that A2 is the winning coalition. This
does not tell us specifically which coalition is formed since it may refer to any
coalition for which m ≤ w(A2) ≤ w(N). To distinguish amongst the win-
ning coalitions, arrange them in order of increasing weights from w(A2) = m
to w(A2) = w(N). The minimal winning coalition, for which w(A2) = m,
should be given “rank” 1 and written as A21. For w(A
2) = m + a, where a
is the weight of player i such that 0 < w(i) ≤ w(j), for all i, j ∈ N assign
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A2 a rank of 2 and write A22. If A
2 < m, i.e. a blocking coalition, assign
it rank zero written as A20. B
2 will have ranks which are the negative of
A2. The losing coalitions are written as B2−1, B
2
−2, ...B
2
−s and for the blocking
coalitions write B20 , Assume that i < j < ... < s for i, j, ..., s numbers of
ranks.
Two conditions must be placed on the proto-coalitions to insure they are
viewed as indivisible units. First, when a follower joins a proto-coalition, he
is not allowed to leave. Secondly, a leader must distribute the side payment
amount he offered the follower to join the proto-coalition. A lower amount
may be given only if the follower agrees.
The symbol αXk will be used to define the payoff to a particular proto-
coalition,Xk, and an imputation will be a set of numbers ({αAk , αBk , ..., αEk})
such that
∑Ek
Xk=Ak αXk = 0. Also note that αi designates the payoff to player,
i. In a zero-sum game that imputation is defined as the set of numbers
({α1, α2, ..., αn}) such that
∑n
i−1 αi = 0.
It is time to supply the reader with formal definitions for Gamson’s initial
expectation and the five situations in which an advantage exists.
Definition 3.22 An initial expectation, E(Xk), for a proto-coalition, Xk,
is an imputation in the rth stage anticipated by Xk in the (r − 1)th stage.
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Note that this is not the same definition found for initial expectation in
Komorita’s equal excess theory.
Definition 3.23 Given a partition in the (r−1)th stage such that A2i , A
2
j , ...
may exist in the rth stage, then a uniquely preferable winning coalition
P 2i , is a coalition such that
1. v(A2i ) > v(A
2
j) and
2. A2i may have an imputation (γXk , γY k , ...) such that, for Xk and Yk ∈
A2i , γXk ≥ αXk and γYk ≥ βY k , where E(X
k) = (αXk , αY k , ...) and
E(Y k) = (βXk , βY k , ...).
Definition 3.24 A uniquely favored proto-coalition , is a proto-coalition,
Xk, such that
1. for A2i , where X
k ∈ A2i , and for A
2
j , where X
k 6∈ A2j , then v(A
2
i ) >
v(A2j); and
2. for Xk, Y k, ... satisfying condition 1, some A2k is possible such that
Xk ∈ A2k and Y
k 6∈ A2k.
Definition 3.25 A proto-coalition, which is contained in all winning coali-
tions when no other proto-coalition holds that same property, is called an
uniquely essential proto-coalition .
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Definition 3.26 A unique coalition is a coalition that is the only possible
winning coalition.
Definition 3.27 A strategically weak proto-coalition , Xk, is one that
cannot become a part of the most valuable winning coalition due to the given
partition in the (r − 1)th stage, i.e., Xk 6∈ A2i .
Given the above definitions, it is possible to examine behavior in the
(r − 1)th stage of the model. Our discussion will be limited to one case. If
the reader wishes to explore all cases, they can be found in Appendix II of
Riker’s Theory of Political Coalitions[14].
Example [3.4] Riker [14] Partition the set N into three proto-coalitions,
A3, B3, C3 in the (r − 1)th stage. Assume that w(A3) > w(B3) > w(C3). If
m = n+1
2
or if m = n
2
+1, then the possible winning coalitions in the rth stage
are (B3 ∪ C3), (A3 ∪ C3), and (A3 ∪B3). The size principle implies that the
values of these coalitions are related thus:
If
v((B3 ∪ C3) = a = −v(A3)
v((A3 ∪ C3) = b = −v(B3)
v((A3 ∪B3) = c = −v(C3),
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then a > b > c. We must determine whether a uniquely preferable winning
coalition exists. In other words,
1. Is there a coalition which has a greater value than any other?
2. Are the initial expectations of every member of that coalition satisfied?
Since a > b > c, the answer to the first question is yes, clearly v(B3∪C3) has
a larger value than any other possible coalition. This leaves us with question
two. To answer this question we need to calculate the initial expectation of
B3. If B3 joins A3 in a coalition and A3 receives a payoff of zero from the
value of v((A3 ∪B3), B3 would obtain the whole payoff, c. Suppose that B3
and C3 form a coalition; the imputation would then be: αA3 = −a, αQ3 =
c, αR3 = (a− c), which is written precisely as (−a, c, a− c). Similarly C
3 has
an initial expectation of b. The coalition containing B3 and C3 can expect
(−a, a−b, b). Knowledge of the relative sizes of a, b, c are needed to determine
if a uniquely preferable winning coalition exists. The size of a, b, c would be
determined by the shape of the curve of the characteristic function. Suppose
that c < a − b; then b < a − c and, C3 would receive the expected initial
payoff of b and the remaining amount, a− b would be more than enough to
pay B3 its initial expected value. Therefore, if the players in the model are
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rational, then the uniquely preferable winning coalition (B3 ∪C3) will form.
Observations made during analysis of the relative position of proto-coalitions
when N is partitioned into three, four, and five subsets produce some general
strategies of coalition-building.
If coalitions are not equally weighted, it is possible that near the end
of the process of coalition-building one or more proto-coalitions will have
some unique advantage. The terms “uniquely favored,” “uniquely prefer-
able,” “uniquely essential,” and “unique” have been used to describe these
situations. A general theory of strategy for end-play is as follows:
1. Any proto-coalition, which finds itself in an advantageous situation,
should exploit the advantage.
2. If a proto-coalition fails to have some sort of advantage, then it should
seek to eliminate or diminish the advantage of other proto-coalitions.
It seems that smaller proto-coalitions more often have uniquely advantageous
positions than do the larger, weighter ones. Since one coalition or proto-
coalition frequently has an advantage, this implies the model has a bias
toward a decision and in turn has no kind of equilibrium.
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Chapter 4
Applications
Introduction
Chapter 4 provides the reader with three applications of game theory. This
chapter includes definitions and examples dealing with airport games, supplier-
firm-buyer games, and evolutionary games. Information found in this chapter
is based primarily on the research of Colman [1a], Driessen [3], Littlechild
and Owen [9] and Stuart [17].
4.1 The Airport Game
One of the most popular applications of game theory is that which determines
the landing fees at airports. It is our desire to develop a “fair” allocation of
these fees. We will show that the simple rules proposed for calculating airport
landing charges are precisely those of the Shapley value for an appropriately
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defined game.
At any airport there occur two types of expenses:
1. variable operating cost due to landing planes of different types and
2. a fixed capital cost for things such as terminal and runway construction.
The problem is determining the fees different types of aircraft will be charged
for landing. It is easy to determine the amount of money each aircraft should
be responsible for paying due to operating cost. Since these costs are directly
connected with the number of times a plane uses the airport, charges are
assigned on a per-landing basis. Fixed capital costs, however, are not so easily
distributed among aircraft. Since larger planes require enlarged runways, it
would not be appropriate to force smaller planes to share in the expense of
maintaining this portion of the runway.
For this reason the following rules, proposed by Baker[1], will be used to
allocate the fixed capital costs to aircraft.
1. Divide the cost of catering for the smallest type of aircraft equally
among the number of landings of all aircraft.
2. Divide the incremental cost of catering for the second smallest type of
aircraft equally among the number of landings of all but the smallest
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type of aircraft.
3. Continue this process until the incremental cost of the largest type of
aircraft is divided equally among the number of landings made by the
largest aircraft type.
The landing charges found as a result of the previous rules is precisely the
Shapley value where the characteristic function is a “cost” function and the
cost of any subset is equal to the cost of the “largest” player in the subset.
Divide the planes intom types (m ≥ 1). Let Nj denote the set of landings
by planes of type j (j = 1, ...m) and let there be nj > 0 landings by aircraft
of type j. Let N = ∪mj=1Nj denote the set of all landings at the airport. Let
Cj be the “cost” associated with providing an adequate runway for planes of
type j. Without loss of generality, assume that
0 = C0 < C1 < C2 < ... < Cm.
Let S ⊂ N , S 6= ∅. Then the cost c(S) of a runway adequate to receive all
landings in S is given by
c(S) = max({Cj| 1 ≤ j ≤ m,S ∩Nj 6= ∅}) (4.1)
and c(∅) = 0.
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Theorem 4.1 Driessen [3] Let (N, c) be the airport cost game of (4.1) and
put mj =
∑m
k=j |Nk| for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Then
Φi(c) =
j∑
k=1
m−1k (Ck − Ck−1)
for i ∈ Nj. (Note that Φi(c) is simply the Shapley value defined in chapter
2.)
Proof: The essential idea in the proof is to write the game of (4.1) as
the sum of m related cost games for which the Shapley values can easily be
determined with the aid of the standard properties for values. Formally, for
any type j = 1, 2, ...,m, we define the cost game (N, cj) by
cj(S)=
{
Cj − Cj−1 if S ∩Mj 6= ∅
0 if S ∩Mj = ∅
where Mj = ∪
m
k=jNk represents the set of all landings by planes of type j and
larger planes.
1. We assert that c(S) =
∑m
k=1 ck(S) for all S ⊂ N (4.2). Let S ⊂ N ,
S 6= ∅. By the definition of the airport game c, there exists a unique
1 ≤ j ≤ m such that c(S) = Cj. Then we obtain S ∩ Nj 6= ∅ and
S ∩Nk = ∅ for all j < k ≤ m. Particularly, S ∩Mk = ∅ if and only if
j < k ≤ m. Now it follows that
m∑
k=1
ck(S) =
j∑
k=1
(Ck − Ck−1) = Cj − C0 = Cj = c(S).
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So, (4.2) holds.
2. Let 1 ≤ j ≤ m. We assert that any i ∈ N −Mj is a dummy in the
game cj. Let i ∈ N −Mj and S ⊂ N − {i}. Then we have cj({i}) = 0
and further, S ∩Mj 6= ∅ if and only if (S ∪ {i}) ∩Mj 6= ∅. It follows
that cj(S ∪ {i}) − cj(S) = 0 = cj({i}), and thus any i ∈ N −Mj is
a dummy in the game cj. Now we conclude from the dummy player
property of the Shapley value that
Φi(cj) = cj({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N−Mj.
3. Let 1 ≤ j ≤ m. We assert that the players in Mj are symmetric in the
game cj. Let i1 ∈ Mj, i2 ∈ Mj and let θ : N → N be a permutation
such that θ(i1) = i2, θ(i2) = i1 and θ(i) = i, for all i ∈ N −{i1, i2}. For
any coalition S 6= ∅, we have the equivalence S ∩Mj 6= ∅ if and only if
θS ∪Mj 6= ∅ and therefore, (θcj)(θS) = cj(S) = cj(θS). It follows that
θcj = cj. Now we conclude from the symmetry property of the Shapley
value that
Φi1(cj) = Φθ(i2)(θcj) = θi2(cj) for all i1, i2 ∈ Mj.
4. Let 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Together with parts (2),(3), the efficiency property of
the Shapley value yields
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Φi(c)=
{
0 if i ∈ N−Mj
m−1j (Cj − Cj−1) if i ∈ nj
From this, the formula (4.2) and the additivity property of the Shapley
value, it follows that for all i ∈ nj
Φi(c) = Φi(
m∑
k=1
ck) =
m∑
k=1
Φi(ck) =
j∑
k=1
m−1k (Ck − Ck−1).
Example [4.1] Littlechild-Owen [9] For a numerical example we shall look
at the total landings at the Birmingham (U.K.) airport during 1968 and 1969.
In this example there are a total of 13,572 landings of 11 different types of
aircraft. As mentioned earlier, there are two types of expenses. A complete
list of notation to be used in Tables [4.1] is the following:
nj = the number of landings by type− j planes
cj = annual capital cost (runway construction)
`j = variable cost per landing
aj = actual landing fee charged
Φj = capital charge for a type− j plane by the Shapley value
(j = 1, ..., 11)
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Table 4.1 Numeric solutions for Ex [4.1]
Aircraft type j cj nj `j Φj Φj + aj aj
Fokker Friendship 27 1 65889 42 5.23 4.86 10.09 5.80
Viscount 800 2 76725 9555 6.09 5.66 11.75 11.40
Hawker Siddeley Trident 3 95200 288 7.55 10.30 17.85 21.70
Britannia 100 4 97200 303 7.71 10.85 18.56 29.80
Caravelle VLR 5 97436 151 7.73 10.92 18.65 20.30
BAC 11 (500) 6 98142 1315 7.79 11.13 18.92 16.70
Vanguard 953 7 102496 505 8.13 13.40 21.53 26.40
Coment 4B 8 104849 1128 8.32 15.07 23.39 29.40
Britannia 300 9 113322 151 8.99 44.80 53.79 34.70
Convair Corronado 10 115440 112 9.16 60.61 69.77 48.30
Boeing 707 11 117676 22 9.34 162.24 171.58 66.70
4.2 Supplier-Firm-Buyer Games
In this section we shall demonstrate how cooperative game theory can be
applied to business strategy. In particular we will examine the Supplier-
Firm-Buyer game. This example of unrestricted bargaining can be modeled
by either the core of the game or the added-value principle.
Definition 4.1 The added value of a coalition S ⊂ N is defined to be the
coalition’s marginal contribution: v(N)− v(N \ S).
Definition 4.2 An outcome satisfies the added-value principle if no player
captures more than his or her added value, that is, if
∀i ∈ N, xi ≤ v(N)− v(N \ {i}), and x(N) = v(N).
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Note that if an outcome is in the core of a game it must also satisfy the added
value principle. The supplier-firm-buyer game is a “three-sided assignment
game” with the following restrictions:
aijk = wjk − cij for all i ∈ N1, j ∈ N2, k ∈ N3. (4.3)
Sets N1,N2,and N3 represent sets of suppliers, firms, and buyers, respectively.
The term wjk denotes buyer k’s willingness to pay for transacting with firm
j, while cij represents supplier i’s opportunity cost for transacting with firm
j.
Definition 4.3 A three-sided assignment game consists of three disjoint
sets, N1,N2, and N3, and a three dimensional assignment matrix, A. The
dimensions of the matrix are n1 × n2 × n3 where ni = |Ni|. The disjoint sets
represent the sets of players. A matching is a 3-tuple ijk consisting of a
player i from set N1, a player j from set N2, and a player k from the set N3.
Element aijk of the matrix A is interpreted as the value that can be created
by the matching ijk. We say the matchings iajaka and ibjbkb are distinct
if ia 6= ib, ja 6= jb, ka 6= kb. An assignment of size r is a set of r distinct
matchings.
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There are two principles that govern the construction of a cooperative game
from an m-sided assignment game. First, distinct matchings determine value
creation. Second, this value is taken to be as large as feasibly possible. We
derive equations (4.4), (4.5) and (4.6) from these principles.
Define the player set, N , to be N1 ∪N2 ∪N3. The characteristic function
v is defined by v(∅) = 0, and for all T ⊆ N ,
v(T ) = 0 if T ∩ Nm = ∅,m ∈ {1, 2, 3}, (4.4)
v({i, j, k}) = aijk ∀i ∈ N1, j ∈ N2, k ∈ N3, and (4.5)
v(T ) = maxr,ASr(ai1j1k1 + ...+ airjrkr), (4.6)
where r ≤ min{|T ∪N1|, |T ∪N2|, |T ∪N3|} and ASr is the set of assignments
of size r constructed from set T .
Example [4.2] Stuart [17] The game described below has two suppliers,
two firms, and only one buyer. Our goal is to determine which firm and
supplier will actually sell to the buyer.
N1 = {s1, s2}, N2 = {f1, f2}, N3 = {b1};
w11 = 100, w21 = 150; c11 = c12 = c21 = c12 = 10.
We can use equations (4.3)-(4.6) to construct the characteristic function
for this example. Since this example has only one buyer, there is only one
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possible matching. Now equation (4.6) dictates that v(N) is the largest
possible matching, namely the buyer with the second firm and either of the
two suppliers. This implies v(N) = 140.
The guaranteed minimum for a given player, `, can be calculated by
max{0, v(N) −
∑
m∈N\{`}(v(N) − v(N \ {m})}. Since, by the added value
principle, no player can receive more than his added value, the above calcu-
lation holds. Note that if every player receives his added value and if there
is still some remaining value, then player ` gains that value. Table [4.2]
provides the added value analysis of the game.
The opportunity cost for each supplier to provide resources is $10 regard-
less of which firm is used. The added value can be interpreted in terms of
competition. Since there is only one supplier needed and all suppliers are
identical, the added value for each supplier is $0. The buyer is willing to
pay $100 for the first firm’s product and willing to pay $150 for the second
firm’s product. Thus, the first firm has an added value of zero, while the
second firm has an added value of $50. Competition between the suppliers
and partial competition between the firms guarantee $90 to the buyer, and
the remaining $50 is divided between the second firm and the buyer.
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Table 4.2 Solutions for Ex [4.2]
Player ` v(N) v(N \ {`}) Added Value Guaranteed Minimum
Buyer 140 0 140 90
Firm 1 140 140 0 0
Firm 2 140 90 50 0
Supplier i 140 140 0 0
4.3 Evolutionary Games
This section provides information about one of the most unusual applications
of game theory. It is in the area of biological evolution. Characteristics
that affect the reproducing capacity of the individuals in a population are
not easily analyzed. The evolution of such characteristics is dependent on
interaction among individuals.
Mating behavior of animals, more specifically the male individual’s need
to establish dominance, will be the focus of this section. The males challenge
each other, but often the battle is one of endurance rather than a battle to
death. It would be unusual, from a biological view point, that animals would
seek to do what is best for the group, i.e. not killing one of its own.
These conflicts are modeled as games by Maynard-Smith [11]. In this
model it is thought each individual chooses from among a set of strategies.
Suppose the first individual chooses strategy, x, and his opponent uses strat-
egy, y; the resulting payoff to the first individual is E(x, y). To biologists
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payoffs are related to the fitness of the individual. Genetics prompt an in-
dividual to choose strategy x and this individual will pass this gene to his
offspring. Since this individual survives he is able to pass this gene. Indi-
viduals whose strategies have a high payoff will produce more offspring than
those with less successful gene types and thus will eventually dominate the
population.
Definition 4.4 Let X be the set of strategies in an evolutionary game. A
strategy x∗ ∈ X is called an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) if for
every y ∈ X, y 6= x∗ ,and for x¯ = (1− ²)x∗ + ²y, then e(x∗, x¯) > e(y, x¯), for
sufficiently small ² > 0.
Note that y may be thought of as a mutation which affects ² of the population.
Definition 4.5 A strategy x∗ ∈ X is an ESS if for every y ∈ X, y 6= x∗,
e(x∗, x∗) ≥ e(y, x∗),
and, moreover, if e(x∗, x∗) = e(y, x∗), then
e(x∗, y) > e(y, y). (4.7)
Before examining a certain multi-person game model, we must first look
at the two-person model. Suppose each individual has to choose between two
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pure fighting strategies. The Hawk (H) strategy involves intensifying the fight
until the opponent is injured and must withdraw. Basically this means the
Hawk always attacks. The Dove (D) strategy involves conventional fighting.
The Dove will retreat before injury occurs if the opponent escalates fighting.
In other words, the Dove always runs.
The payoff, involved when a Hawk is in battle with a Dove is written
as E(H,D). The payoff is a measure of the increase or decrease in the
individual’s expected lifetime reproductive success in comparison to some
baseline measure. This payoff measure is often referred to as the change
in Darwinian fitness of the individual and is dependent upon three factors.
According to Maynard-Smith and Price these factors are as follows:
1. The advantage of winning: the resources over which the contest
takes place is assumed to be worth V (for victory) units of Darwinian
fitness to the winner.
2. The disadvantage of being injured: injury alters an animal’s fit-
ness by −W (for wounds) units.
3. The time and energy wasted in a long contest: the alteration
of the fitness of each contestant by −T (for time) units in conventional
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fights.
Using the components described above, we can determine payoffs for every
possible combination of strategies. Matrix 4.1 gives a summary of the payoffs
for the Hawk-Dove game.
Hawk Dove
Hawk V−W
2
V
Dove 0 V
2
− T
Matrix 4.1
Since there are equal chances of success and injury when the two similar
strategies compete, we must divide the payoff by two. Now we shall analyze
examples of two different cases.
Example [4.3] Thomas [18] In this case the advantage of winning outweighs
any disadvantage due to injury; i.e., V ≥ D. Put V = 4,W = 2. Then we
get the following matrix:
Hawk Dove
Hawk 1 4
Dove 0 2
.
Matrix 4.2
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Look at the pure Hawk strategy, x = (1, 0), and take any other strategy
y = (y, 1− y), y 6= 1:
e(x, x) = 1 ≥ y = e(y, x),
and so Hawk is an ESS.
Example [4.4] Thomas [18] In this scenario injury outweighs the advantage
of winning; i.e., V ≤ W . Put V = 2,W = 4. Thus we get the following
matrix:
Hawk Dove
Hawk −1 2
Dove 0 1
.
Matrix 4.3
In this game strategy x = ( 1
2
, 1
2
) is an ESS, as shown below. Let y = (y, 1−
y) y 6= 1
2
; then
e(x, x) =
1
2
= e(y, x).
and by condition (4.7)
e(y, y)− = 1− 2y2, e(x, y) =
3
2
− 3y.
Now (3
2
− 2y)− (1− 2y2) = 2(y − 1
2
)2 > 0, so since y 6= 1
2
, we have
e(x, y)− e(y, y) > 0,
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which proves x is an ESS.
Let us now turn our attention to a multi-person game model. Colman [2]
suggests constructing a compound multi-person game in which the players
compete in a series of two-person contests, which follow the payoff structure
found in Matrix 4.1.
The expected payoff will be a linear function of the proportion of other
members of the population playing Hawk or Dove. This is due to the fact that
animals have to adopt either a Hawk or a Dove strategy. It is not important
that each animal plays every other animal, but only that animals are involved
in the same number of competitions. Our focus is on the expected payoffs
per contest since our only concern is the relative fitness of the genotypes.
If members of the population play the two-person game given by Matrix
4.1, then payoffs in each contest are based on two factors. The first is the in-
dividual’s own strategy, and the second, is the proportion of other animals in
the population adopting the Hawk strategy. Let k represent that proportion,
where 0 ≤ k ≤ 1; then it follows that the proportion of Dove opponents is
1− k. Suppose the individual adopts the Hawk strategy; then the expected
payoff E(H) is E(H) = k V−W
2
+ (1 − k)V and if the individual adopts the
Dove strategy then,the expected payoff E(D) is E(D) = (1− k)( V
2
− T.)
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Suppose for illustrative purposes that V = 10, W = 20, T = 3; then
Figure (4.1) depicts the resultant compound game. From this figure we
can conclude there is no pure ESS. If the population contains mostly Doves
(k is small) then, the expected payoff E(H) to a Hawk is higher than the
expected payoff E(D) to a Dove. If this is true, the population of Hawks will
increase by natural selection shifting the outcome toward the equilibrium. At
equilibrium the payoff to the Hawk and Dove are equal and the proportion
of population of Hawks to Doves will remain stable.
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J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
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JJ
hhhhhhhhhhhhhh
k=0 k=1
0
-8
10 E(H)
E(D)
u
e
e
u
Figure (4.1) Resultant of the Hawk verses Dove Game
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Suppose the population contains mostly Hawks (k is large). In this case the
payoff E(D) to Doves is higher. Therefore the Hawk population will decrease
until equilibrium is reached. This implies that no matter what proportions
of Hawks and Doves initially exit, the population will evolve to the ESS
equilibrium.
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